The preservation of the Sharī#a in the area of personal status law has often been presented as the 'sacrificial lamb' of modernisers who had been intent on imposing secular codes in the areas of civil, criminal and commercial matters at the turn of the twentieth century. The piecemeal and fragmentary reform of family law that ensued meant that gains by women remained at the margins, and hence could not achieve true equality. It has thus been argued that serving justice to women and meeting the requirements of modernity, requires a secularisation of the family law altogether, and the application of a standard of absolute equality. 1 This approach, however, ignores the fact that any law must be compatible with the social setting in which it operates. The public has to readily accept the laws they are required to conform with and give effect to. Disrupting the careful balance between social and legal norms "creates tensions, and usually does not stand the test of daily life. " 2 Since the turn of the twenty-first century Egypt's personal status law has undergone a gradual reform process that demonstrates the possibility of further developing these laws, without the need to secularise them altogether. Although reforms have often been slow to come, they have gradually granted women greater equality rights. Every national, religious and cultural group have the right to practice and manifest their own religious and cultural beliefs; depriving them of such a right would, in itself, constitute a violation of international human rights standards. Sharī#a-derived personal status legislation is engrained in the identities of many Muslim women as well as men. Depriving them of the right to adhere to the principles that form the pillars of their belief system cannot possibly be considered as a legitimate aim. Although the CEDAW is unequivocal in its demand for equality between the genders in family relations, the intent of the CEDAW cannot possibly be to force different groups of women into lifestyles which they themselves do not approve of. It is inconceivable for the international human rights movement to remain impervious to the reality that cultural particularities and diverse worldviews exist, and that they have the potential to achieve standards of equality through internal validation processes. According to Behrouz, imposed foreign values are not easily internalized. As a matter of both ethics and policy, then, restrictions on the rights of Muslim women can best be challenged by showing that such restrictions are not in fact required by Islam in the context of present-day Islamic societies. This is not an unrealistic task. 3 It is narrow-minded to construe the relationship between international human rights standards and religious beliefs as inherently antagonistic. Rather than engaging in such polemics, what is required is a heightened respect for pluralism in the human rights debate in order to adequately address the needs of diverse groups of women. Such an exercise is not an apology for discriminatory practices and laws; it requires the highest degree of scrutiny of prevailing rules and a radical break with those that disadvantage women and deviate from the principles of human dignity. In other words, if a core group of women's human rights can be recognised as constituting universal standards that are to apply without regard to religion and culture, there are other rights that would have to be culturally qualified, without jeopardising women's dignity. Achieving equality for women is a two-way road that requires a compromise solution, with the aim of genuinely improving their status, rather than serving the ideological purposes of an international and academic elite, detached from the realities and preferences of the women on whose behalf they purport to speak.
The elimination of gender discrimination requires that Egypt, as a party to the CEDAW "assume a role in the reform process to ensure that its international duty is fulfilled. " 4 However, this raises the question of whether this obligation is met if legal reforms are introduced by the State, but rejected by the people and those who represent them. In such a case, would the State have absolved itself of any responsibility for the persistence of discriminatory laws and practices?
In spite of its mixed record, Egypt has demonstrated a commitment to reforming its family law over the past ten years. This process began with
